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abstract
In comparative social science, policy feedback has become a widely popular device with which to 
understand policy persistence and the impacts of state-making and political entrepreneurship on 
mass opinion. Although the existence of such effects is frequently taken for granted, recent work has 
challenged prevailing assumptions about the unproblematic nature of feedback from policy change to 
mass opinion. This is an opportune time to put policy feedback to further test. We do so by bringing to 
bear the two main theoretical perspectives that underlie established and recent scholarship, and applying 
for the first time survey experiments to evaluate key expectations. Focusing on the relatively novel 
domain of counter-terrorism policy, we analyze data drawn from a national survey conducted in 2009. 
Results from embedded experiments suggest new evidence for policy feedback effects. Analysis of 
mechanisms suggests limits in interest-centered explanations, and the relevance of some under-studied, 
cognitive factors. We discuss implications and limits of our study for policy feedback scholarship, and 
with further reference to the case of U.S. attitudes toward the war on terror. 
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On Policy Feedback: Insights from Survey Experiments 
 
 
In comparative social science, policy feedback has become a widely popular 
device with which to understand policy persistence and the impacts of 
state-making and political entrepreneurship on mass opinion. Although the 
existence of such effects is frequently taken for granted, recent work has 
challenged prevailing assumptions about the unproblematic nature of 
feedback from policy change to mass opinion. This is an opportune time to 
put policy feedback to further test. We do so by bringing to bear the two 
main theoretical perspectives that underlie established and recent 
scholarship, and applying for the first time survey experiments to evaluate 
key expectations. Focusing on the relatively novel domain of counter-
terrorism policy, we analyze data drawn from a national survey conducted 
in 2009. Results from embedded experiments suggest new evidence for 
policy feedback effects. Analysis of mechanisms suggests limits in interest-
centered explanations, and the relevance of some under-studied, cognitive 
factors. We discuss implications and limits of our study for policy feedback 
scholarship, and with further reference to the case of U.S. attitudes toward 
the war on terror.  
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On Policy Feedback: Insights from Survey Experiments 
 
 
The concept of policy feedback has become a popular, even defining, tool of comparative 
social science. When new laws are enacted or existing policies extended, such changes are said to 
redirect preferences and expectations on the part of citizens, interest groups, and parties. That is 
policy feedback. It is encapsulated by the expression “policies produce politics” (Pierson 1993).  
Policy feedback has furnished analysts with a perspective from which to understand self-
reproducing dynamics and the historical “stickiness” of certain public policies and institutions. For 
instance, the design of welfare policies shapes how citizens view program beneficiaries (Gilens 1999; 
Steensland 2006; Bruch Ferree, and Soss 2010), in turn molding public attitudes toward government 
programs. In social democracies, a universalistic distribution of entitlements (Korpi and Palme 1998; 
Rothstein 1998; Svallfors 2006) buttresses welfare state legitimacy and persistence. More generally, a 
nation’s institutional arrangements are frequently viewed as becoming as self-maintaining as the 
QWERTY keyboard (Lijphart 1994; Powell 2000: Alexander 2001).  
 But alongside successful applications of the policy feedback thesis has been a limitation. 
Here, a tendency is to focus on “positive” cases, where policy adoption ultimately leads to 
acceptance on the part of national populations or interest groups. But what happens when new 
pieces of legislation fail to secure legitimacy, or simply leave mass attitudes unmoved? 
 Until quite recently, questions of this sort were not a priority in policy feedback scholarship. 
But their growing importance is powerfully demonstrated by new work challenging views of a 
straightforward process of feedback from policy change to mass opinion-formation. Analyzing 
survey data before and after the 1996 reform of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Soss and 
Schram (2007) find no evidence of change in public attitudes towards the poor and towards specific 
welfare programs. Also focusing on the case of U.S. welfare reform, Dyck and Hussey (2008) find 
that AFDC retrenchment failed to dislodge the strong impacts of racial attitudes on policy opinions. 
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These impacts persisted even though changes in means-tested benefits were also accompanied by 
declining stereotypes of welfare recipients in the media (Dyck and Hussey 2008, p. 596).  
 How can we square these results with firmly-entrenched expectations from the policy 
feedback literature? There is a deep-seated yet largely unarticulated clash of theoretical perspectives 
at hand. In established applications, feedback from new legislation to mass attitude-formation, 
particularly as involving state-making or programmatic initiatives (Pierson 1993; Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Mettler and Soss 2004), is often seen as routine and unproblematic. This is because 
citizens view their interests as tied to the new regime, and policy-makers often design programs with 
an eye to enhancing perceptions of legitimacy (May 1991; Kumlin 2002; Svallfors 2010).  
 In contrast, an alternative perspective, one implicated in a major strain of cognitive-
psychological scholarship (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002), is that prior beliefs and biases 
filter how individuals reason about, and respond to, policy change. This makes the influence of 
policy much more contingent. Of further significance is the phenomenon of “motivated” reasoning 
(Ditto and Lopez 1992; Jost Federico, and Napier 2009), where entrenched beliefs may lead to 
negative views of policy modification to the status quo. Here, individuals tend to disregard 
environmental changes or stimuli that are inconsistent with their preferences.  
 The clash between the preceding views of policy feedback is important. At stake are sharply 
divergent expectations about what causal factors matter, and just when feedback is likely to occur. 
When coupled with a suitable research design, we believe a closer engagement with these competing 
perspectives offers new insights for policy feedback scholarship.  
This is where the current study comes in. We start by laying out key assumptions and 
expectations underlying previous studies, distinguishing global versus contingency perspectives. 
Global perspectives see feedback as common: policy change shifts citizens’ perception of interests, or 
instead elicit compliance through cognitive dissonance reduction. Contingency-oriented alternatives 
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point to a much stronger role for prior beliefs and preferences. Now citizens’ pre-existing biases filter 
(and render less predictable) their responses to policy change, making policy feedback less common, 
and dependent upon which biases are activated in specific contexts.  
We seek to advance scholarly understanding of these two perspectives with data from a new 
national survey, The 2009 Survey of American Policy Attitudes. SAPA fields experiments into the 
dynamics of opinion formation, enabling us to systematically gauge how policies influence opinions 
as “treatment effects” (Vergne and Durand 2010; see also Chong and Druckman 2007). Survey 
experiments combine probability samples’ generalizability with a way of separating information 
about policy change from other stimuli with which they are typically correlated. Ours is the first 
study (of which we are aware) to bring experimental methods to the study of policy feedback. 
We focus on the case of counter-terrorism policy and the dynamics of opinion formation in 
the United States (Davis 2007; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Investigating a relatively novel policy 
domain, we offer results that complement and extend those based on social policy-making domains. 
We discuss how findings shed new light on theoretical tensions between global versus contingency 
perspectives on policy feedback dynamics. Of course, there are limitations in our study pertaining to 
methods and substantive focus, and we discuss these as well in conclusion.  
 
TWO PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY FEEDBACK  
State-Centered Theories and Global Feedback 
 The presumption of much established scholarship is that policy feedback is common and 
relatively unproblematic. This view owes much to the pioneering work of North (1990), who 
demonstrated how even inefficient economic institutions tend to persist because their rules 
continually shape organizations and players operating within their fields. A rupture in this path 
dependent process requires the appearance of a new actor, one who would benefit from radical 
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modifications to existing rules, while at the same time having the capacity to successfully pursue 
implementation. Severe contradictions between economic and political institutions (North and 
Shirley 2008), or the intervention of an exogenous organization (Boettke et al. 2008) could facilitate 
this type of change. But for the most part this is seen as an infrequent phenomenon.1  
North did not initially consider policy feedbacks and mass opinion as such, but comparative 
social scientists soon became interested in precisely such applications. A pioneer in this theory 
transfer was Pierson (1993; 1996; see also Skocpol 1992), who argued that social welfare programs 
had reshaped the structure of interests in developed capitalist societies. So dependent are most 
citizens on some form of government provision that alternatives to the status quo, especially in the 
form of spending cuts, are vigorously resisted. Policy feedbacks should be seen as “ratchets,” 
establishing “the new point of reference for discussions on further welfare state development” 
(Huber and Stephens 2001, p. 3). 
 Key to these policy feedback applications is that politicians and political institutions are 
fundamental influences on the lives and orientations of citizens. Indeed, this has been a defining 
assumption of the “state-centered” turn in comparative social science (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and 
Skocpol 1985). Together, this leads to what we term the global feedback thesis, where new laws or a 
redirection of policy are expected to be of major consequence for mass opinion-formation.  
 How and why do laws and policy tend to exert influence over mass attitudes? Scholars 
within the state-centered tradition have frequently pointed to interests as the central mechanism. 
The design of institutions and policy arrangements are seen as shaping citizens’ incentives to support 
specific policies (Pierson 1993, 2004; Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen 2005). When governments 
                                                            
1 “Wars, revolutions, conquest, and natural disasters are sources of discontinuous institutional change... But 
the single most important point about institutional change, which must be grasped if we are to begin to get a 
handle on the subject, is that institutional change is overwhelmingly incremental” (North, 1990, p. 89). 
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offer job-specific training and protections, members of high-skill occupations come to depend upon, 
and strongly support, such arrangements (Iversen and Soskice 2001).2 In social-democratic nations, 
a universalistic distribution of benefits and services gives working- and middle-class citizens alike a
vested interest in maintaining access to government provision (Korpi and Palme 1998). 
 
                                                           
 But is there ever more to policy effects than economic incentives? What if national publics’ 
dependence on existing institutions and their attitudinal responses to policy change have an 
intrinsically cognitive dimension? It is here we can readily discern a second and less explicitly 
articulated type of mechanism.3 We identify this mechanism as cognitive dissonance reduction, drawing 
from a longstanding tradition of psychological research on the subject.  
Cognitive dissonance involves individuals adapting to behavioral or environmental change. 
They do so by adjusting attitudes to reduce psychic tensions. In Festinger’s classic studies (1957; 
Festinger and Carlsmith 1959), individuals receiving minimal payment for completing a repetitive 
task changed their attitudes more (and in a more positive direction) than those given larger payments 
for the same task. Here, individuals seek to (unconsciously) avoid stress caused by behavioral 
compliance with environmental demands. There is a tendency to bring attitudes in line with new 
realities, making policy feedback a common phenomenon. But whereas interest-centered 
explanations see policy change as shaping mass attitudes by giving individuals new benefits, 
cognitive dissonance views policy change as shaping mass opinion by instead providing little-to-no 
 
2 In this context, there is a parallel between welfare state scholarship and the “dynamic representation” model 
of Erikson, MacKeun, and Stimson (2002). This model focuses on aggregated measures of policy legislation, 
yet its emphasis on rational expectations is analytically comparable to the interest-centered view of policy 
feedback. We do not seek in this study to unpack the dynamic representation model, but findings applicable 
to the global feedback approach may have relevance in future scholarship on the topic.  
 
3 North’s later work (2006) issues a call for greater consideration of cognitive processes that link individuals 
to institutions and institutional change, offering a sharp distinction between “interests” and (non-rational) 
processes of belief-formation. Similarly, Svallfors (1997, p. 172) hypothesizes that “Institutions provide 
‘normalcy,’ that is, they suggest to people what is ‘the normal state of affairs’…” 
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benefits. Both lines of thinking thus lead to global expectations of policy feedbacks as common, but 
they differ with respect to the mechanism responsible for such effects.  
 Festinger’s results have been extended in a rich array of laboratory studies (Aronson, Wilson, 
and Akert 2006; Cooper 2007; Egan, Santos, and Bloom 2007), where, for instance, individuals who 
read material with which they disagree are more likely to upwardly revise their opinions when 
receiving no tangible rewards. Cognitive dissonance captures the broad class of cases where forced 
compliance may lead to attitude adjustment, even in the absence of clear reward or perceived 
improvement to welfare. If policy change leaves citizens with little alternative to compliance, 
cognitive dissonance is a candidate mechanism behind feedback effects on opinion-formation.  
 
Voter Heuristics, Contingent Policy Feedback 
 Expectations of global policy feedback have been constructively challenged by the studies of 
U.S. welfare reform discussed in the introduction. Underlying these studies is a very different view 
of mechanisms behind opinion-formation, especially as regards processing of information about 
changes in the environment. This alternative view is best understood as emphasizing the mediating 
role of heuristics and biases. This leads to the expectation that policy feedback is a less common and 
more contingent phenomenon. Whether policy shifts reorient citizens’ preferences depends upon the 
pre-existing biases that dispose some individuals to welcome (or instead reject) the changes at hand.  
 In Dyck and Hussey’s study (2008), U.S. voters retained negative attitudes toward welfare 
programs and beneficiaries in the face of a transformation in the federal government’s AFDC 
program. It is these enduring attitudes that suggest heuristic reasoning and the influence of prior 
biases. Like partisanship or ideological identification (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Bartels 
2002; Jost et al. 2009), for instance, racial attitudes can be a powerful filter of the information that 
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individuals are willing to accept.4 In the case of U.S. welfare reform, negative views of the assumed 
intersection of welfare dependency and race operated as a lens through which many voters saw the 
issues at hand. As such, they were not easily reshaped by simply downsizing the AFDC program.  
 In the heuristics and biases approach, then, individuals rarely encounter policy and other 
environmental change without recourse to prior beliefs (Gilovich et al. 2002). Of course, which 
particular set of beliefs are accessible is probabilistic (Iyengar 1990; Zaller 1992), varying across 
context as well as individual. But diverging from the expectation of state-centered theorizing, policy 
change and other shifts in the macro-environment do not always enjoy special causal status.  
When it comes to how policy change shapes mass opinion, the heuristics and biases 
approach thus predicts that this influence will be mediated by which predispositions are activated in 
specific contexts. The impact of policy change interacts with prior beliefs. That leads to 
heterogeneous effects across the population, and, again, a more contingent view of policy feedback.  
Consider, for instance, this study’s empirical focus on counter-terrorism policies. It is 
conceivable that self-identified liberals and conservatives respond differently to information about 
policy change. If liberals oppose policies viewed as restricting rights, they may be unmoved by the 
specter of legislative change, in line with the “motivated reasoning” scenario.5 Policy change would 
thus interact with ideology, and this interaction makes policy feedback a contingent phenomenon.  
 
Theoretical Expectations and the Case of Counter-Terrorism Policies  
                                                            
4 Of note in this context is how racial attitudes and biases, once acquired in childhood (Sears and Funk 1999) 
show considerable stability over the life course, paralleling the “aging/stability” found for partisanship and 
other ideological orientations (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; see also Krosnick and Berent 1993).  
 
5 Motivated reasoning occurs when individuals’ beliefs dispose them to reject news and other information 
perceived to be inconsistent with prior expectations (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Jost et al. 2009). In one classic 
study, individuals receiving negative medical news reacted by intensifying beliefs in their positive health status.  
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 To summarize and recap, what should we expect if the global expectations associated with 
state-centered theorizing and established scholarship are met? Then, policy influence on opinion-
formation should be common and consequential. It should operate by redefining citizens’ interests 
or through cognitive dissonance.  
 But if citizens instead view policy change through the lens of prior beliefs, feedback process 
will be more contingent. Policy change will not always reorient opinion, and impacts will be 
mediated by which heuristics and biases are activated. Liberals and conservatives may, for instance, 
respond quite differently when confronted with the scenario of new counter-terrorism policies.  
 How can we use these competing perspectives to advance our understanding of policy 
feedback? The domain of counter-terrorism policy has much to offer scholars. Since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, counter-terrorism laws and policies have experienced a watershed series of changes 
in the United States.6 That provides a rich source of material for hypothesis-testing. Welfare state 
policy-making, while representing by far the dominant focus in policy feedback scholarship, shows a 
good deal more continuity. By the same token, the 1996 retrenchment of the AFDC program reveals 
the analytic benefits of research taking advantage of a policy domain experiencing extensive change.  
 A focus on counter-terrorism policies has a second analytic benefit. As discussed further 
below, it enables us to begin disentangling mechanisms underlying feedback effects involving 
interest/incentive-related factors. In particular, the expected utility of counter-terrorism policies 
involves calculations about the risk of future attacks. By directly measuring these calculations in the 
analyses, we can better gauge the impact of interest versus alternative factors behind policy feedback. 
                                                            
6 These include the 2001 Patriot Act, the 2006 Military Commissions Act, the 2008 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Amendment Act (providing retroactive authorization for the National Security Agency’s 
“warrantless wiretapping” program), and the establishment of military detention centers alongside the (now-
banned) use of torture (Lichtblau 2008; Mayer 2008; Bergen and Tiedemann 2010). 
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When conjoined with the survey experiments discussed below, this empirical focus yields new 
findings about mechanisms underlying policy feedback effects on opinion.  
 
EXPERIMENTS, DATA, AND MEASURES  
Survey Experiments 
In this study, we use experiments to test hypotheses and probe mechanisms behind policy 
feedback. Why experiments? A general benefit is to guard against selection bias (and methodological 
skepticism) more systematically than is possible in conventional, non-experimental research. Ours is 
the first study (of which we are aware) to employ experiments to analyze policy impacts on opinion-
formation. This provides policy feedback scholarship with some new tools for analysis.  
 A second feature is that our experiments are embedded in a nationally-representative survey. 
This design harnesses the strengths of experiments to the generalizing power of the social survey. 
The use of embedded survey experiments has been central to advances in political psychology 
(Sniderman et al. 1991; Chong and Druckman 2007; see also Schuman and Presser 1977).  
 In the experiments we analyze, survey respondents are randomly assigned to policy change 
(treatment) and baseline (control group) conditions. In the control group, respondents answer a baseline 
question probing attitudes toward a counter-terrorism law or measure. In the experimental 
condition, policy change is a treatment-effect, and the baseline question is conjoined with reference 
to a specific instance of policy change. By virtue of randomization, difference in measured attitudes 
across control and treatment conditions can be attributed to the reference to policy change.7  
                                                            
7 We emphasize that we are exposing respondents to information about policy change they may already 
possess. By virtue of randomization, any pre-existing differences in information level about policy change are, 
of course, independent of exposure to the treatment at hand. As a result, estimation of policy feedback effects 
is methodologically conservative. This lends some confidence to results, and we return to this point in 
conclusion.  
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 A New National Survey 
 Our data are from The Survey of American Policy Attitudes (SAPA). Conducted in 2009, SAPA 
has a total sample size of 1,542, although estimation samples are smaller due to the design of 
experiments. Data collection was carried out by the Center for Survey Research at Indiana 
University. The instrument was pre-tested in April of 2009, and data collection took place in May 
and June. Additional details are discussed in Appendix I.  
 SAPA offers two experiments into policy feedback. In each, the baseline (control group) 
item probes respondents’ opinions on a specific counter-terrorism policy or practice. Differences 
across control versus treatment groups are evaluated using analysis of variance and regression.8 
 
Dependent Variables 
 Our first experiment concerns torture. As summarized in Table 1, there is a pair of 
treatment-effect conditions relating to policy change. The first prefaces the baseline item with 
reference to President Obama issuing an order stopping the “use of coercive interrogation 
methods.” The second treatment-effect prefaces the item with reference to past “use of coercive 
interrogation methods when interrogating suspects in places such as Abu Ghraib...” This is, by 
design, a demanding test for feedback because individuals would have to instantaneously bring their 
policy attitudes in line with the specter of legislative change.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
8 We follow Krosnick and Berent (1993) by using a two-part format, where respondents first answer an initial 
agree/disagree question, with a second question probing opinion strength. This branching design yields 
Likert-type response categories ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, and as established by 
Krosnick and Berent’s experiments, the branching format tends to improve survey measurement.  
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 The second counter-terrorism policy item probes attitudes toward electronic surveillance by 
the National Security Agency. Now, the treatment effect refers to the 2008 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Amendment Act. This piece of legislation provided (retroactive) authorization to earlier, 
“warrantless” surveillance involving domestic communications (Lichtblau 2008).  
 
Independent Variables 
 In addition to the feedback experiments, we use regression to analyze mechanisms behind 
policy feedback. The pay-off here is to test for interactions between the policy feedback conditions 
and independent variables measuring candidate mechanisms. The two main mechanisms we 
consider are interests relating to counter-terrorist policies, and also ideology.  
 Recall that established scholarship and state-centered theorizing assume policy feedback 
generally occurs because individuals see themselves as benefiting from, and coming to have a vested 
interest in, the policy at hand. In the case of counter-terrorism policies, we measure interests using 
an item probing respondents’ fears of a terrorist attack.9 If interests/incentives underlie the 
operation of policy feedback, we expect an interaction between the policy-feedback condition and 
the covariate for terrorism fears. That is because it is individuals with higher levels of fear who are 
expected to be more favorably disposed to support a given counter-terrorism policy when exposed to 
information about policy change. It is, in principle, possible that there are other interest-related processes 
at work, but we follow recent scholarship in focusing on fear/anxiety as a potent (and easily 
mobilized) factor behind counter-terrorism policy support (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).  
                                                            
9 All in all, how concerned are you that the United States might suffer another terrorist attack in the next 12 months? <1> 
not concerned at all; <2> not very concerned; <3> somewhat concerned; <4> very concerned.  
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 The second independent variable is for the key heuristic of ideology. We follow Sniderman 
et al. (1991; see also Jost et al. 2009), measuring ideology using a seven-point scale in which 
respondents' classify themselves using scores from 1 (“strong liberal “) through 7 (“ strong 
conservative”). The relevant hypothesis is that experimental conditions interact with ideology. But in 
contrast to interests, the feedback-by-ideology interaction relates to the heuristics and biases 
approach. If mechanisms underlying feedback involve prior beliefs of this sort, liberals and 
conservatives should respond in different ways to information about policy change.  
 In addition to terrorism fears and ideology, we consider the following independent variables 
in the regression analysis. Nationalism is a scale constructed from responses to three items.10 
Education and age are continuous covariates (measured in years), indexing values or cognitive styles 
associated with schooling and life course/generational processes. The remaining independent 
variables are for gender, race, class, and church attendance. Gender (female = 1) and race (black = 
1) are dichotomies. A seven-category measure of class follows the EGP scheme (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992), and we treat this as a series of indicator variables. The church attendance 
covariate is continuous, with seven categories ranging from daily attendance to never.  
 
RESULTS  
Does Policy Change Matter?  
 Using the 2009 SAPA data, we consider the evidence that policy change may influence the 
process of opinion-formation on issues of counter-terrorism. In Figure 1 below, there are two 
                                                            
10 These items ask respondents their level of agreement/disagreement with the following propositions: 
America should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations? Generally speaking, America is a better 
country than most other countries? People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong? Following the lead 
of scholarship using these items in the General Social Surveys (Smith and Jarkko 1998), we transform the items 
into z-scores, summing them into a scale.  
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treatment-effect conditions. In the first, priming individuals with information about a presidential 
executive order leads to higher support for the use of torture. In this case, there is evidence for a 
significant policy feedback effect, albeit in an unexpected direction. Looking at the second torture 
experiment, priming individuals with information about past uses of torture by the government has 
essentially the same effect, raising by .09 support for this contentious activity.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
   
 Moving to Figure 2’s results, the next experiment is for attitudes toward domestic 
surveillance practices employed by the National Security Agency. The baseline item elicits a low level 
of initial support (.19). But when reference is made to the earlier passage of the 2008 Foreign 
Intelligence Security Amendments Act, measured support is notably higher (.31).  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
What Mechanisms Underlie Feedback?  
 So far, SAPA’s experiments suggest intriguing evidence for the impact of policy change on 
counter-terrorism policy opinions. This evidence now calls out for clarification and additional 
consideration of mechanisms. To put the matter as a question, why does providing information 
about policy change often reshape policy attitudes?  
 We address this question using results presented in Table 2 below. These are tests for 
interactions between experimental exposure to policy feedback and two key covariates measuring 
mechanisms underlying the global versus contingency perspectives on policy feedback: interests and 
ideology. The interaction effects are from regression models that now treat the policy-attitude items 
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as dependent variables. There are also main effects for respondents’ assignment to control and 
treatment-effect conditions (alongside the remaining independent variables). These are not 
presented in Table 2 to avoid clutter.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Looking at the torture results, there is no evidence of interactions involving policy-feedback 
conditions and the key measures of interests or ideology.11 In other words, whether or not 
respondents are given information about policy change, they modify their opinions without first 
consulting their initial ideological inclinations. The same is true with respect to their underlying 
stakes in reducing anxieties concerning the prospect of terrorism.  
For NSA surveillance, there is evidence for interactions involving both interests and 
ideology, at least when the latter are estimated in separate statistical models. But as displayed in the 
last two rows of Table 2, when both interactions are estimated in the same model, but there are little 
grounds for retaining the ideology × policy-feedback condition. The results thus point to the single, 
interest × policy-feedback interaction, and with a coefficient of −.10 (s.e. = .04), the policy feedback 
effects for NSA surveillance are stronger among fearful respondents. We discuss the magnitude of 
this interaction in the paper’s next section.  
 So what should we make of the case of torture in which policy feedback effects are 
statistically independent of ideology and interest-related factors? This tells us that interest-related 
factors, as measured by terrorism fears, do not explain the feedback process in the torture 
                                                            
11 Disaggregating tests for interactions in the torture experiment’s multiple policy feedback conditions yields 
identical results. For the record, we also find no evidence of interactions involving the nationalism covariate.  
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experiments. The same is true of ideological orientations. This is not to say that terrorism fears and 
ideology have no significant main effects, but that these effects do little to account for the key 
feedback process at hand.  
 This leaves us with cognitive dissonance as a candidate. For attitudes towards toward torture, 
cognitive dissonance may underlie the policy feedback effect. If so, when information about relevant 
policy activities is made available, individuals respond by adjusting their opinions, avoiding potential 
discord caused by the new environment at hand.  
 
The Magnitude of Feedback Effects  
 Just how large are the feedback effects on opinion-formation that we have unearthed? 
Coefficients from our regression models give perspective. Because the independent variables of 
interest are a mix of categorical (feedback condition assignment) and continuous covariates 
(terrorism fears and ideology), we employ a range-standardization to compare coefficients.12  
 We start with Table 3’s results for torture. By way of example, the .18 estimate indicates that 
moving from lowest to highest response options on the terrorism fears item increases support for 
the use of torture. These standardizations suggest that at .09, the magnitude of the feedback effect is 
half that of terrorism fears (.18), and overshadowed by ideological predispositions (.48).13 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                            
12 We present in Appendix II unstandardized coefficients and standard errors for models.  
 
13 Complementing the feedback effect estimate presented in Table 3, the parallel estimate for the second 
feedback condition (“President Obama issued an order”) is also .09.  
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 In Table 4 we consider regression results for NSA surveillance. The interaction means that 
the feedback effect is much smaller at lower levels of terrorism fear (-.04) than at higher levels of 
fear (.26). Similarly, the impact of terrorism fears is smaller in the baseline condition (-.03) than in 
the feedback condition (.27). For its part, ideology has substantial direct effects (.24) on policy 
attitudes. But as discussed further below, the absence of any interaction between ideology and 
feedback condition is telling when it comes to the clash of global versus contingency perspectives.  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
DISCUSSION 
 When and why does policy feedback occur? Since the pioneering work of North (1990) was 
vigorously applied to comparative welfare state development (Pierson 1993; see also Skocpol 1992), 
a consensus has been that policy change routinely re-makes mass opinion by shaping citizens’ 
interests and their incentive to comply with new institutional arrangements. But looking at the 1996 
reform of the U.S. AFDC program, recent work has constructively challenged this consensus.
 This study offers a novel application of survey experiments and a fresh focus on counter-
terrorism policy. Together, our experiments suggest evidence that policy change in this domain can 
shape the process of opinion-formation. Counter-terrorism policies are an instructive context in 
which to extend policy feedback scholarship, for they represent issues that can be viewed as 
“distant” from most citizens’ immediate experience, and thus potentially poor candidates for 
feedback effect (Soss and Schram 2007, p. 121).  
 The evidence for policy feedback effects on opinion may thus be surprising to some, and 
indeed our survey experiments present a deliberately demanding test. In particular, because the 
experimental treatments make available information respondents may already possess, this design, if 
17 
anything, may understate the impact of policy change on mass attitudes. As a result, the experiments 
provide some degree of confidence, though their initial character should again be emphasized.  
 What of the clash between universal and contingency perspectives underlying established 
versus more recent scholarship on policy feedback? Initially, we might expect counter-terrorism 
policy feedbacks to be best explicated by the literature on heuristics and biases. But recall our 
thematic finding that the mere mention of an instance of policy change nudges mass attitudes in new 
directions. This diverges from the heuristics and biases expectation that the filtering of information 
will make policy feedback a more contingent phenomenon. Prior beliefs such as ideological 
identification do appear to shape counter-terrorism attitudes (that is consistent with estimates in our 
regression models). But they appear to have limited explanatory bearing on the feedback processes 
at hand, for there is no evidence for any selective mobilization of pre-existing biases.  
 This brings us to the global perspective, where our evidence for policy feedbacks in counter-
terrorism opinions should be comforting to many comparative social scientists. Yet the detailed 
results may be surprising to analysts who assume policy feedback operates primarily through 
incentives and interests. The expected utility of counter-terrorism policies involves calculations 
about the risk of future attacks, where individuals experiencing greater fear should be more receptive 
to information about policy change. But we find evidence of this sort in only one of our two cases.  
 For the NSA surveillance issue, results are consistent with the operation of cognitive 
dissonance, where individuals seek to avoid anxieties caused by compliance with environmental 
demands, bringing attitudes in line with new realities. Our evidence for cognitive dissonance is of 
course indirect and in need of further study. In general, we would anticipate that cognitive 
dissonance has greatest merit as a mechanism behind policy feedback when opinion change unfolds 
rapidly, and when there is also an absence (or irrelevance) of incentives. If so, our results may 
caution against assuming interests alone to be the sole micro-foundations of policy feedback effects.  
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 Together, then, our results signal the fruitfulness of further work. Experiments have promise 
in providing some new foundations for linking macro-conditions to individual-level processes of 
opinion-formation. We would emphasize the positive-sum character of these tools with respect to 
comparative/historical and over-time survey analyses (e.g., Soss and Schram 2007; Bruch et al. 2010; 
Svallfors 2010). As the development of U.S. counter-terrorism policies continues to unfold, there is 
merit in applying multiple methods of inquiry, here and with respect to other policy domains as well.  
 
Conclusion 
 What about counter-terrorism as a focus in its own right? There is much at stake, as changes 
in this policy domain since September 11, 2001 have been extensive. What are mechanisms behind 
opinion-formation on counter-terrorism policies and practices? We know from past research that 
Americans continue to offer general endorsements of rights and liberties (Best et al. 2006; Davis 
2007). Simultaneously, however, the capacities of political elites to mobilize fears of terrorism 
(Mueller 2006; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; see also Willer and Adams 2008) buttress support for 
many counter-terrorism policies.  
Our addition of policy feedback experiments adds a new consideration to the mix. It is again 
of note that in both the experiments we conducted, the mere mention of a change in law or 
government action is enough to nudge attitudes in new directions. Our experiments appear to be 
picking up an important dynamic in how Americans respond readily (and rapidly) to the pervasive 
influence of counter-terrorism policies and practices themselves.  
In this context, it is notable that the torture experiment into effects of an executive order 
banning “coercive interrogation techniques” raised support for this contentious activity. Does this 
mean that policy and legal changes reining-in counter-terrorism measures will tend to follow a 
similar pattern? That seems premature, and the current results lack the reach to engage this broad 
19 
question. New applications of survey experiments may provide one line of fruitful research, and we 
believe the case of counter-terrorism attitudes is an important one in its own right, and also for 
policy feedback scholarship. 
20 
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Appendix I: Survey of American Policy Attitudes, 2009 (SAPA) 
 
The Survey of American Policy Attitudes was developed in cooperation with the Center for 
Survey Research (CSR) at Indiana University. Data were collected using computer assisted 
telephone interviewing methods (CATI), and numbers were randomly generated using the 
Genesys list‐assisted method. This method allows for unpublished numbers and new listings 
to be sampled. After selecting a random sample of telephone numbers, numbers were 
matched to a database of business and non‐working numbers, and all matches were 
subsequently purged from the sample. The sample was nationwide, and at each residential 
number a respondent from all household members age 18 or older was selected.  
 
The data collection staff included 11 supervisors and 54 interviewers. All interviewers 
received at least 20 hours of training in interviewing techniques before production 
interviewing. Interviewers were instructed to read questions and response categories at a 
pace slower than conversation, and to use neutral probes and feedback phrases. Audio and 
visual monitoring was regularly conducted by the telephone survey supervisors using the 
CSR facilities. Monitoring was conducted randomly, with each interviewer being monitored 
at least once during each 3‐hour shift. 
 
All cases with confirmed valid telephone numbers were called up to 15 times, unless the 
respondent refused or there was insufficient time before the end of the study. Cases with 
unknown validity (persistent no answers or answering devices) were called a minimum of 8 
times, with calls made during the morning, afternoon, evening, and weekend. Interviewers 
attempted to convert each ʺrefusalʺ at least twice. When possible, a conversion attempt was 
made at the first instance of refusal and a second attempt is usually made after a few days.  
 
Final Disposition Summary  
 
The following tables classify every case according to its final disposition. These dispositions 
are based on the guidelines for Final Disposition Codes for RDD Surveys established by the 
American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Standard Definitions for Final 
Dispositions of Case Codes, 2004. Using AAPOR’s RR3 (Response Rate 3 formula), we 
calculated the response rate as 0.1527 (or 15.3%). 
 
This response rate is in line with ongoing declines in participation found in U.S. 
telephone surveys. Research on the impact of these trends on data quality suggests that 
declining response rates are not by themselves tantamount to response bias, or that 
probability sampling should necessarily be abandoned in favor of such alternatives as 
quota sampling (Groves 2006). A relevant result of experiments into effects on data 
quality (Keeter et al. 2006) is that low rates are likely a source of bias only insofar as the 
probability of survey participation is correlated with one or more measured variables of 
interest. In SAPA, the majority of non‐responses (unknown eligibility or not‐interviewed) 
was a product of conditions such as no answers on the line and an initial refusal to 
participate before the start of the survey itself (or any item) were described.  
 
 
 
Interview  RDD  Panel  Total 
Completed interviews  1325  217  1542 
Partial completions  7  10  17 
                                                                                            Total Interviews  1332  227  1559 
Eligible, Non‐Interview                                                                                                    
Refusal  4324  112  4436 
Break‐off (Refused after starting interview)  143  3  146 
Respondent never available  896  73  969 
Telephone answering device (message confirms housing unit)  124  17  141 
Respondent away duration of the survey  18  2  20 
Deceased  1  5  6 
Physically or mentally unable/incompetent  38  0  38 
Language  169  0  169 
Total Eligible, Non‐Interviews:  5713  212  5925 
Unknown Eligibility, Non‐Interview     
Always busy  112  9  121 
No answer  1786  34  1820 
Telephone answering device (unknown if housing unit)  1652  136  1788 
Call Barrier  2  0  2 
Technical phone problems (line/circuit problems)  837  18  855 
Respondent not found  0  111  111 
Total Unknown Eligibility, Non‐Interviews:  4389  308  4697 
Not Eligible     
Fax/data line  1014  0  1014 
Non‐working/disconnected number  3495  0  3495 
Temporary non‐working/disconnected number  54  0  54 
Number change  70  0  70 
Cell phone  13  0  13 
Call forwarded  22  0  22 
Business, government office, other organization  615  0  615 
Institution  27  0  27 
Group quarters  7  0  7 
Seasonal home  31  0  31 
Not eligible – no adult household members  11  0  11 
Quota met  0  62  62 
                                                                                       Total Not Eligible:  5359  62  5421 
Total Sample:  16793  809  17602 
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                                                         coefficient (s.e.) 
     
 
“Obama stopped use” (0 = baseline) 
 
   
           .08∗ (.03)  
 “Govt. used methods” (0 = baseline) 
 
             .09∗ (.03)  
 fear of terrorism   
 
             .06∗  (.02)  
 education   
 
        < −.01 (<.01)  
 ideology   
 
             .08∗  (.01)  
 nationalism   
 
             .11∗  (.02)  
 age            < −.01  (<.01)  
 
 female (0 = male) 
 
            −.03   (.03)  
 black (0 = non‐black) 
 
              .02   (.04)  
 manager (0 = non‐working) 
 
            −.03    (.07)  
 professional (0 = non‐working) 
 
              .02   (.04)  
 routine white collar (0 = non‐working) 
 
             .08∗  (.04)  
 self‐employed (0 = non‐working) 
 
              .11   (.06)  
 skilled worker (0 = non‐working) 
 
              .06   (.05)  
 unskilled worker (0 = non‐working) 
 
              .09   (.05)  
 church attendance 
 
            −.02∗ (.01) 
 constant 
 
              .03    (.11)  
 
 R2 / N  
 
  
              .26 / 947 
       
 * indicates p < .05 (t‐test).    
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                                                          coefficient (s.e.) 
     
 
 “2008 FISA Act” (0 = baseline) 
 
   
          −.14    (.11)  
 fear of terrorism   
 
           −.01    (.03)  
 fear of terrorism × feedback condition   
 
           −.10∗  (.04)  
 education   
 
            −.01   (.01)  
 ideology   
 
              .04∗ (.01)  
 nationalism   
 
              .03   (.03)  
 age            < −.01  (<.01)  
 
 female (0 = male) 
 
            −.02   (.03)  
 black (0 = non‐black) 
 
            −.03   (.05)  
 manager (0 = non‐working) 
 
            −.03    (.09)  
 professional (0 = non‐working) 
 
            −.01   (.06)  
 routine white collar (0 = non‐working) 
 
             .06    (.05)  
 self‐employed (0 = non‐working) 
 
              .06   (.07)  
 skilled worker (0 = non‐working) 
 
            −.06   (.05)  
 unskilled worker (0 = non‐working) 
 
            −.04   (.06)  
 church attendance 
 
              .01   (.01) 
 constant 
 
              .22    (.14)  
 
 R2 / N  
 
  
             .12 / 653 
       
 * indicates p < .05 (t‐test).    
 
 
   
     Figure 1: Feedback experiments − torture
  
    * indicates p<.05.   
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Table 1: Policy feedback experiments and dependent variables 
                     
Torture 
baseline (control group) item:  
Do you agree or disagree that government authorities should have the right to torture a suspect if they 
think it will help prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in the United States? 
 
experimental (policy feedback) item:  
As you may know, in 2009, President Obama issued an order stopping the use of coercive interrogation 
methods. Do you agree or disagree that government authorities should have the right to torture a suspect 
if they think it will help prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in the United States? 
 
experimental (policy feedback) item:  
As you may know, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government sometimes used 
coercive interrogation methods when interrogating suspects in places such as Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo Bay. Do you agree or disagree that government authorities should have the right to torture 
a suspect if they think it will help prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in the United States? 
 
NSA surveillance 
baseline (control group) item:  
Do you think that the federal government should monitor telephone conversations, banking transactions, 
and email between American citizens in the United States? 
 
experimental (policy feedback) item:  
As you may know, the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act gives government 
agencies new powers to engage in domestic surveillance of both citizens and foreign nationals without 
getting a court order allowing them to do so.] Do you think that the federal government should monitor 
telephone conversations, banking transactions, and email between American citizens in the United 
States? 
 
 
 Table 2: Test      s for interactions   
 
                              
      
 
 
                                                                 test resultsa 
     
 
torture: 
 
   
  × interests [terrorism fears]                                                      F(2, 928) =  .10; p > F = .91      
 
 
 
  × ideology [liberal/conservative identification]                                     F(2, 928) =  .95; p > F = .39   
   
 
NSA surveillance: 
 
   
  × interests [terrorism fears]                                                      F(1, 636) =7.34; p > F < .01   
 
 
 
  × ideology [liberal/conservative identification]                                     F(1, 636) =4.45; p > F < .04   
 
 
  × interests [terrorism fears]b                                                                      F(1, 635) =4.93; p > F < .03     
  × ideology [liberal/conservative identification]b                                    F(1, 635) =2.06; p > F = .15  
     
          a. Shaded entry indicates significance at the .05 level.            
b. Interactions between feedback condition and both interests and ideology estimated in the same model. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Magnitude of poli      cy feedback effects − torture   
 
  torture 
               
       
 
   feedback (government used methods)                                                                                                  .09 
 
 
  terrorism fears (Δ not at all → very)                                                                                                     .18 
 
 
  ideology (Δ strong lib. → strong con.)                                                                                                   .48 
 
         
 
 
 
 
     Table 4: Magnitude of policy feed      back effects − NSA surveillance   
 
    NSA surveillance 
 
 
                
      
 
     feedback (2008 FISA Act) @ terrorism fears = not at all)            −.04 
 
 
     feedback (2008 FISA Act) @ terrorism fears = very)                      .26 
 
 
      terrorism fears (Δ very → not at all) @ baseline condition          −.03 
 
 
      terrorism fears (Δ very → not at all) @ feedback condition        −.27 
 
 
      ideology (Δ strong lib. → strong con.)                                               .24 
 
         
 
 
 
Working PaPers Published in:  
instituto de Políticas y bienes Públicos (iPP), 2011
1. holl, a., Pardo, r. & rama, r.  Spatial patterns of adoption of just-in-time manufacturing.
2. brooks, c. & calzada, i. On policy feedback: insights from survey experiments.
